Iran

[El Guapo]

This morning’s newsletter from the NYT, “What Iran Wants,” provides some analysis on the motivations and results of Iran’s proxy wars: Spoiler - Iran is winning.

Iran has emerged as the chief architect in multiple conflicts strafing the Middle East, from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf.

It trained and helped arm the Iraqi militias that killed three U.S. service members with a drone in Jordan this weekend. It supplied Hamas and Hezbollah in their clashes with Israel. It launched missiles at anti-Iranian militants inside Pakistan in response to the bombing of a local police station in December. And it has helped Houthi warriors in Yemen attack container ships in the Red Sea to protest the war in Gaza. All of which, taken together, threaten a wider war . . .

To achieve regional hegemony and safeguard its theocracy, Iran has responded on three fronts: military, diplomatic and economic. Those efforts have become more assertive in the past year, especially since the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas.

Militarily, Iran’s government wants to project strength without drawing fire on its own territory, which could jeopardize its already tenuous popular support. Its strategy has been to build up regional proxy forces so that it rarely launches attacks from its own soil.

Those forces include Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza and a handful of Shiite militias in Iraq. Each has its own goals, but all are in agreement with Iran about combating Western troops in the region and diminishing Israel’s standing. The United States designates each of them as a foreign terrorist organization. Since the October attack on Israel, these groups have targeted Israel’s northern front, U.S. positions in Iraq and Syria, U.S. warships and international cargo ships in the Red Sea . . .

Iran’s foreign policy is designed to try to reverse its image as an isolated nation — particularly after the U.S. intensified sanctions in 2018. Even before Oct. 7, it was cultivating its Arab neighbors as well as Russia and China. Early in 2023, for the first time in decades, Iran normalized relations with Saudi Arabia, repairing a rift between the two countries in a deal brokered by China . . .

Economically, Iran has had far more limited success dodging U.S. sanctions, leaving many Iranians poorer and more resentful of the government. The regime faced widespread protests in 2022 and 2023 over hijab mandates, and the nation’s supreme leader has been urging women to vote in upcoming elections, signaling his concern that the government has antagonized them . . .

“There’s a good case to be made that Iran is a major winner from this conflict,” said Dalia Dassa Kaye, a political scientist at the Burkle Center for International Relations at the University of California, Los Angeles. “The war is in many ways boosting Iranians’ domestic, regional and global situation.”

She added, “So far, Iran has been able to gain all these benefits without paying direct costs.”

The Biden administration needs to find a way to end this. Iran cannot be allowed to sit back and direct its proxies to wreak havoc in the Middle East and threaten U.S. interests and regional stability. We need to act decisively to send a message to Tehran that it’s going to start paying some “direct costs” and that those costs will increase significantly the longer Iran continues to play this proxy game.

I agree, but part of the challenge is that the best way to end all of this is for Iranians to overthrow the government and replace it with a democratic government. That's both what most Iranians seem to want and also best for the U.S. and the region. And responding militarily to Iran, and most especially striking inside Iran, is at least risky in terms of getting to that outcome.

[hepcat]

I know that there has been a lot of unrest in Iran surrounding the religious extremism of the government, but does that equate to a taste for democracy? Or a favorable impression of America? That's an honest question. I don't know.

Also, put aside the current situation in Israel in discussing this. I'm sure our support for Israel is not helping our standing any.

[LawBeefaroni]

Cyberwarfare. Predatory Sparrow has had some success there.

Plus the Stuxnet attack back in 2010.

[El Guapo]

I know that there has been a lot of unrest in Iran surrounding the religious extremism of the government, but does that equate to a taste for democracy? Or a favorable impression of America? That's an honest question. I don't know.

Also, put aside the current situation in Israel in discussing this. I'm sure our support for Israel is not helping our standing any.

There have been several mass pro-democracy anti-government protests in Iran over the past couple decades. Plus native democracy movements in Iran date way back to the late 19th century (and for that matter the current Iranian government has a democratic structure, although it's a mostly pretend one in that the theocrats get to effectively make most of the choices that matter).

You will also sometimes see U.S. and Israeli flags at Iranian protests. Judging the exact feelings of Iranians is difficult given, you know, the lack of unbiased polling of Iranians, BUT you also have to bear in mind that there's a strong "enemy of my enemy" effect in play. Basically the Iranian government has been doing the "death to U.S. (and Israel)" since its creation, so if you dislike the Iranian government (as most Iranians seem to) you're probably more likely to have at least somewhat favorable views of the U.S.

All of this adds up to the fact that popular movement that is able to overthrow the current theocratic government of Iran is vastly more likely to be closer to the U.S. and to be vastly more responsible on the world stage (and, having overthrown an Islamist fundamentalist government, is unlikely to be friendly to groups like Hezbollah and Hamas).

[Holman]

"NEW: U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) confirms that U.S. forces struck more than 85 targets against Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force and affiliated militia groups."

These targets are in Syria, not in Iran itself, making this (technically) not an escalation.

[LawBeefaroni]

Appears to be more substantial than the Shayrat airbase missile strike in 2017. Back then we managed to kill 9 soldiers, 5 adult civilians, and 4 kids back then. Blew up some planes though. With about $120M worth of Tomahawks.

[Holman]

Iranian proxies killed 3 Americans and wounded 40. That requires a response.

Sure, it's probably expensive, but the precision nature of the weapons also sends a message (both to Tehran and to the wider world, given events in Gaza).

[Kurth]

This sounds like exactly the proportionate but significant response we needed.

[LawBeefaroni]

Iranian proxies killed 3 Americans and wounded 40. That requires a response.

Sure, it's probably expensive, but the precision nature of the weapons also sends a message (both to Tehran and to the wider world, given events in Gaza).

I was talking about the toothless strike in 2017. This one sounds like it was more effective.

[Holman]

Iranian proxies killed 3 Americans and wounded 40. That requires a response.

Sure, it's probably expensive, but the precision nature of the weapons also sends a message (both to Tehran and to the wider world, given events in Gaza).

I was talking about the toothless strike in 2017. This one sounds like it was more effective.

Understood.